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Abstract
’Conﬂict diamonds’ refers to the fatal role that diamonds are believed
to have played in several African conﬂicts. The article analyzes the im-
pact of diamond abundance on economic growth in light of the broader,
previously discovered empirical ﬁnding of a ’curse of natural resources’.
By extending the theory of appropriative conﬂict, a predator-prey game
is outlined in which a rebel chooses between peaceful production and
predation on natural resources controlled by the ruler. It is shown that
whereas an increase in natural resources will increase the ruler’s public
utility investments, it might also lead to a crowding-out of labor from the
formal sector to the appropriative struggle, which depresses growth. As
predicted by the model, a cross-country regression analysis suggests that
diamond abundance has a negative relationship with economic growth
in countries with weak institutions.
Keywords: diamonds, appropriative conﬂict, curse of natural re-
sources, growth, predation.
JEL Codes: O13, O40, Q32
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several empirical studies have indicated a negative relationship between nat-
ural resource abundance and economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Sachs
and Warner, 1997, 2001). The reasons for this ’curse of natural resources’
are not well understood. In some cases, the curse seems to work through
Dutch disease eﬀects, i.e. the natural resource sector crowds out other sectors
in society. In other cases, it appears that natural resource abundance gives
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1rise to unproductive rent seeking that impedes economic development (Auty,
2001a). In general, there are good reasons to believe that the curse works
very diﬀerently depending on the type of natural resource in question and on
the nature of the economic environment. For instance, it has been argued
that ’point resources’ such as minerals have a particularly strong association
with destabilizing social tension (Auty and Gelb, 2001).
This article focuses on a mineral resource that has received much atten-
tion in news reports during recent years for its alleged involvement as a prize
in detrimental civil conﬂicts; diamonds. Fighting over diamond deposits are
believed to have been an important reason for the initiation, maintenance and
prolonging of civil unrest in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (henceforth referred to as Congo-Kinshasa). As a con-
sequence, the United Nations have imposed sanctions on ’conﬂict diamonds’
originating from areas controlled by illegitimate rebel groups (United Nations,
2002). Unconﬁrmed reports have also linked illicit diamond trade with ter-
rorist organizations like Hezbollah and al-Qaeda (Farah, 2001a; 2001b; Hill,
2002; Campbell, 2004).
By extending the general appropriative conﬂict-framework of Grossman
(1991), Hirshleifer (1991), and Grossman and Kim (1995), this article presents
a model of the links between natural resource abundance, social conﬂict, and
economic growth. The basic set-up is a sequential, predator-prey game be-
tween a ruler (the prey) in control of a ﬂow of natural resource rents, and
a rebel (the predator) who might choose to prey on the ruler’s natural re-
source riches. Caught in between, there is a peaceful citizen who provides the
country’s oﬃcial output and whose production depends on public utilities like
roads provided by the ruler. The model shows that in equilibrium, an increase
in natural resource rents increases ruler’s public utility investments but also
increases the ruler’s need to defend himself against the predatory rebel. The
need for defense forces might thus crowd out labor from the formal sector and
depress growth. What eﬀect dominates depends crucially on the strength of
institutions constraining government expropriation and corruption. In coun-
tries with weak institutions, natural resources are likely to be a curse whereas
the reverse is true in countries with strong institutions.
On the basis of the general model, it is argued that among all natural or
mineral resources, diamonds are the ideal reward for a potential predator due
to their extremely high price, their eﬃcient convertibility to money or arms,
their small practical size, their indestructibility, and the diﬃculty with which
their origin can be established. In an empirical section, it is further shown
that a ’Barro-style’ cross-country growth regression provides some support for
the basic hypothesis of a negative relationship between diamond abundance
and growth for the sample of predominantly weakly institutionalized diamond
producers.
The article is related to and attempts to synthesize two distinct lines of
research. The ﬁrst line of research is that dealing with the relationship be-
tween natural resource abundance and economic development. Empirically,
2the curse of natural resources on growth has been explored primarily by Jef-
frey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1997, 2001), although earlier studies have
recognized the potentially negative eﬀects of a great resource endowment on
development in general (for overviews, see Sachs and Warner, 1997 or Auty,
2001). Several explanations have been proposed in the literature. The Dutch
disease explanation - originally formalized by Corden and Neary (1982) and
supported by Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001) - suggests that a booming re-
source sector leads to an exchange rate appreciation that crowds out exports
from the important manufacturing sector, which in the longer run is the key
sector of the economy. Another hypothesis is that an abundance of natural
resources make governments neglect investments in human capital (Gylfason,
2001). Mehlum et al (2002) and Boschini et al (2003) further show empiri-
cally that the prevalence of a resource curse depends critically on the quality
of institutions.
Proponents of the political economy view argue that a great resource abun-
dance typically leads to a factional, predatory state (as opposed to a devel-
opmental political state) that is characterized by soft market constraints, a
small, privileged elite in control of the resources, slow human and social capi-
tal accumulation, and the retarded emergence of a manufacturing sector (Lal
and Myint, 1996; Auty, 2001b; Auty and Gelb, 2001). This so called ’staple
trap model’ provides a general, intuitive framework for understanding how
causality runs from resource endowments to poor economic outcomes. But
due to its schematic simplicity, it cannot be easily used for a more formal
analysis of marginal eﬀects or empirical model calibrations. A more rigor-
ous analysis of the relevant links has recently been provided by Torvik (2002)
whose model shows that an increase in natural resources increases the number
of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and hence decreases income.
The second research tradition is the economics of social conﬂict which
is more in line with mainstream economic theory (Tullock, 1974; Roemer,
1985; Grossman, 1991; Hirshleifer, 1991, 1995; Skaperdas, 1992; Grossman
and Kim, 1995; Noh, 2002; Mehlum et al, 2003). The typical set-up is an
economy where private property rights are not perfect so that a one-shot or
sequential game arises where agents might choose between normal productive
activities and predation on the other agent’s assets. The two agents might
be either a predator and a prey or two opposing factions. In their empiri-
cal assessments of the determinants of civil war during 1960-99, Collier and
Hoeﬄer (1998, 2001) shows that economic agendas (greed) are indeed often
t h ed r i v i n gf o r c ei ns o c i a lc o n ﬂict, as predicted by theory. Similar results
for the post-Cold War era have been obtained by de Soysa (2002). So far,
conﬂict theory has not often been used in more empirically oriented analyses
of economic development. Collier (2000a) is one of few attempts that use this
theory to analyze the relationship between natural resource abundance and
social unrest, but linkages to growth are not derived.
The research presented below makes at least two contributions to the ex-
isting literature: First, the article presents a comprehensive theory of the links
3between natural resource abundance, social conﬂict, and economic growth. In
doing so, it synthesizes the theoretical literature on social conﬂict with the
empirical ﬁndings of a curse of natural resources conditional upon the quality
of institutions. Second, to the author’s knowledge, it is the ﬁrst eﬀort to
make an empirical analysis of the rough diamond industry in the light of con-
ﬂict theory and to assess econometrically the relationship between diamond
production and growth for a large sample of countries.
The article is structured as follows: Section two gives a brief overview
of the basic facts about the rough diamond industry. Section three presents
a model of appropriative conﬂict while section four argues that among all
natural resources, diamonds are the ideal reward for a loot-seeking rebel.
Section ﬁve then provides the empirical analysis. Section six concludes the
exposition.
2 The Rough Diamond Industry
Total annual production of rough diamond in the world today amounts to
about 120 million carats (or 24 tons). Table 1 lists the current 18 diamond
producing countries in the world. Australia has had the highest average an-
nual production during the 1990s at 39 million carats, followed by Russia,
Congo-Kinshasa, Botswana, and South Africa. These ﬁve countries alone had
roughly 88% of total world production. Africa is by far the continent with
the greatest number of diamond-producing countries (12 of 18).
Depending on quality, rough diamonds c a nb eu s e de i t h e ra sg e m s t o n e so r
for industrial purposes. Stones with the highest quality in terms of clarity and
color are sold at high prices as gemstones at major diamond trading centres
such as Antwerp, Dubai, New York or Tel Aviv. They are then reexported all
around the world to be cut and polished. Once a diamond has come this far in
the process, its origin is impossible to trace. As Table 1 shows, the percentage
of gemstone in total production varies from 20% in China to almost 95% in
Namibia and 100% in Canada. The gemstone percentage gives an indication
of the value of production. The average price per carat in the year 2000 of a
diamond from Namibia amounted to 271$ as compared to the average world
price of 71$ (Rombouts, 2001).
If average annual production is divided by land area, we get an indication
of the intensity of diamond abundance in the individual countries. The third
column in Table 1 shows that the dominant country in this comparison is
Botswana with a production of nearly 31 carats per square kilometer. Second
and third, but far behind, comes Congo-Kinshasa and South Africa at 8.4 and
8.2. Note that some very small countries like Sierra Leone become relatively
diamond intensive (3.84) whereas the second greatest producer in absolute
terms, Russia, now receives a low intensity (1.2).
The term conﬂict diamonds or blood diamonds alludes to the role that
diamonds have played in initiating, ﬁnancing, and possibly prolonging civil
wars in Africa. The United Nations use the following deﬁnition: ”Conﬂict
diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or fac-
4tions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and
are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in
contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.” (United Nations,
2002).
Fighting over diamonds is not a new phenomenon. Already in the Medieval
times, diamonds were the cause of war among Indian kingdoms. However, the
link between diamonds and civil war was highlighted in the end of the 1990s
when it became apparent that the Angolan rebel army UNITA could sus-
tain its long war against the government with the assistance of proceeds from
diamond exports. In an eﬀort to reduce ﬁghting, the UN Security Council
adopted resolutions 1173 and 1176 that prohibited direct or indirect import of
all Angolan diamonds that were not certiﬁed by the government. Diamonds
were also found to be a prime source of revenue for the RUF rebel movement
in Sierra Leone, infamous around the world for their atrocities against civil-
ians. In the year 2000, the Security Council’s resolution 1306 imposed a ban
on all import of diamonds supplied by the RUF. Due to the Liberian govern-
ment’s links to the RUF, a ban on imports from that country was adopted
the following year (United Nations, 2002). Panel of Experts (2001a, 2001b)
have further revealed how diamonds and other natural resources in Congo-
Kinshasa have played a crucial role in the continuing international conﬂict on
Congolese soil that followed the uprising against president Laurent Kabila.
It should be remarked though that by winter 2004, a development towards
peace was in place in at least Congo-Kinshasa, Angola, and Sierra Leone,
although the ﬁrst country sporadically experiences intense ethnic warfare in
the Ituri region. The direction of development in Liberia, where warlord
president Charles Taylor was overthrown by rebels, is still unclear.
The fourth column of Table 1 gives a feeling for the disastrous economic
eﬀects of diamond-related wars in the 1990s. The average annual growth rate
between 1990 and 1999 was -3.14 percent in Angola, -7.86 in Sierra Leone,
and -8.33 in Congo-Kinshasa. In real terms, income per capita during the
period declined by almost 50 percent in the latter country.
3T h e o r y
In the subsection below, we will present a model of a developing economy
where a potential predatory rebel is motivated by the prospect of conquering
the rents from a natural resource endowment that is initially controlled by
a ruler. The model suggests a mechanism through which natural resource
abundance might cause appropriative conﬂicts that are harmful to growth.
3.1 A Predator-Prey Model
The model assumes an economy with three representative agents; a ruler
whom we will refer to as Ruler, a prospective rebel called Rebel, and a common
man called Citizen. These three agents might be thought of as representing
diﬀerent social classes or ethnic groups in society. The interaction between
the three takes the form of a sequential game where Ruler is a Stackelberg
5leader who makes his allocative choices ﬁrst. We will analyze developments
over two periods; an initial peaceful period and a second period that might
or might not be characterized by social conﬂict. The two stages of the game
are both played out in the second period. One time period should be thought
of as a decade.
Rebel does not take part in the formal economy. Normally, he lives on
subsistence activities but might also resort to predation on Ruler’s natural
resources. He might or might not reside in the country whose ruler he occa-
sionally attacks. Rebel might be marginalized from the rest of the economy
because of ethnic discrimination or just because the formal sector is too small
to swallow all rural people.1
Let us assume that Rebel controls a labor endowment l which represents
the value of his total labor eﬀort during one period. In the ﬁrst period, Rebel
is peaceful and lives on subsistence. In the second period, Rebel considers
splitting his total eﬀort between productive activities q2 and predatory activ-
ities a2 such that l = a2 + q2. Predatory activities are meant to include both
relatively non-violent extortion as well as armed rebellions. The object of pre-
dation is Ruler’s appropriable natural resource endowment D. This variable
shows the world market value of natural resource extraction during a period
of time (we normalize the price to be equal to 1). For simplicity, we assume
that the ﬂow of natural resource rents is identical in the two periods.
Rebel’s utility function is:
URebel = ηl + η(l − a2)+p2δD (1)
The level of utility URebel thus depends on ﬁrst and second-period subsis-
tence production (the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side) and on revenues
from natural resource predation (the last term). The incomes from predation
and production are perfect substitutes and Rebel’s sole source of utility is his
own material well-being.2
Starting with the revenues of predation, p2 is the fraction of appropriable
natural resources D that Rebel manages to conquer in the struggle with Ruler
in the second period and (1 − p2) is the fraction that Ruler retains. The
determinants of p2 will be discussed below.
As a result of the known hostility between Ruler and Rebel, the natural
resources of the country must be oﬀered abroad at a discounted price in
the second period, reﬂected by the parameter δ < 1. This discount will be
in place regardless of whether an actual war breaks out or not. The level
of the discount depends on the publicity that the conﬂict receives abroad
1There are several instances of peoples being deliberately marginalized for ethnical rea-
sons. One such group are the Banyamulenge in former Zaire who lost their citizenship
during Mobutu’s last years and then took part in the rebellion led by Kabila (Olsson and
Congdon Fors, 2004).
2What this implies is that when Rebel considers starting a predatory rebellion, he is
completely indiﬀerent about matters such as justice, honor, or prestige. For the realism of
such an assumption, see the discussions in Herbst (2000) or Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001).
6and from foreign traders’ assessment of the risks of buying natural resources
from the country in question. It might even be the case that sanctions are
imposed, which would make δ low or even zero in the case of a perfect sanction.
However, if it is hard to trace the origin of D and if the natural resource is
easily smuggled, then δ will tend to be closer to the world market price. The
’post-conﬂict’ value of the appropriable, extracted resources is therefore δD
and the eﬀective utility from Rebel’s conquest is p2δD.
Output from peaceful subsistence is given by the extremely simple ’AK’-
production function ηqt where η is a productivity parameter and where q1 = l
and q2 =( l − a2). Obviously, peaceful production is the opportunity cost of
predation.
The share of natural resources that Rebel conquers is given by a function





As mentioned above, a2 is the labor that Rebel devotes to predation whereas
the new variable b2 reﬂects labor resources that Ruler devotes to defending
his natural resource endowment D. These labor resource are provided by
Citizen, who must follow Ruler’s orders. At any level b2 > 0,a ni n c r e a s ei n
Rebel’s predation eﬀort a2 increases the fraction that Rebel captures and vice
versa. More precisely, it is easily shown that p2 is positive and concave in a2
and negative and convex in b2. a2+b2 is the total number of people in society
allocated to appropriative conﬂict.
Citizen stands for the country’s total formal production which includes
sectors like manufacturing, modern agriculture, and formal services. In our
model, Rebel does not prey on Citizen since the formal sector’s output is not
as easily appropriated as a stock of valuable natural resources.4 The level of




A is a total factor productivity, capturing aspects like the level of technol-
ogy, environmental factors, or the general quality of government policy and
institutions in the country’s formal sector. ht is the labor that citizen devotes
to formal production at time t =( 1 ,2) whereas kt is the stock of physical
public utilities like roads, electricity, and water provided by Ruler. Note that
unlike Rebel, Citizen can fully utilize kt. In both periods, Citizen has a total
labor endowment of n. This endowment is split between productive activities
ht and defense against the predatory Rebel bt such that n = ht + bt.S i n c e
the ﬁrst period is peaceful, h1 = n whereas we might have that h2 = n − b2.
Ruler decides what level of b2 that is required, as will be shown below.
3See for instance Hirshleifer (1989), Grossman (1991), or Neary (1997) for discussions of
the properties of diﬀerent forms of this function.
4Actually, there are several instances of how rebels have resorted to looting the local
population rather than ﬁghting the government army (Azam, 2002). In order to keep the
model simple, we will not consider this possibility in the model.
7For his labor services in the formal sector, Citizen receives a wage equal
to the his marginal product. The total wage payment is therefore αAhα
t k1−α
t .
Ruler taxes Citizen with a marginal income tax rate of τ < 1.T h i st a xr a t e
should be thought of as the revenue-maximizing tax rate in line with a Laﬀer
curve-like framework. Ruler does not attempt to tax Rebel who is hiding in
the bush. We assume that Citizen’s after-tax income is always higher than
Rebel’s maximum income from peaceful work: (1 − τ)αyt > ηl. If it were
not, Citizen would have an incentive to take up subsistence agriculture in the
jungle and become an outlaw rebel.5 Citizen’s objective is simply to retain
as much income as possible after taxation.
In each period t, Ruler thus controls two types of income streams; the
tax payments from Citizen and the proceeds from selling one period’s ex-
traction of natural resources on the world market D. We assume that tax
payments ﬁnance short-run state administration G such that ταy1 = G.N a t -
ural resource rents D are either used for more long-term investments in public
utilities (kt+1 − kt) or for personal enrichment of the Ruler and his cronies.
Let γ (Z) ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of total rents that is used for productive ends.
This fraction depends positively on the quality of property rights institutions
Z, reﬂecting the constraints against government expropriation. The essential
properties of the function are γ
0
(Z) > 0, limZ→∞ γ (Z)=1 ,a n dlimA→0
γ (Z)=0 .T h ef r a c t i o n1−γ (Z) is withdrawn from the formal economy into
the Ruler’s pockets.6
Since k1 is given from previous periods, Ruler faces the budget restriction:7
γ (Z)D =( k2 − k1) (4)
Finally, we assume that Ruler’s utility is a simple additive function of
government revenue over the two periods:
URuler = D + ταy1 +( 1− p2)δD + ταy2
Large government revenues means great power and good opportunities for
personal enrichment, as was discussed above. If there is a battle against Rebel
in the second period, Ruler rescues a share (1 − p2)δ of his natural resource
wealth where p2 was deﬁned above. Note that Ruler only indirectly (via tax
receipts) receives utility from the levels of national output yt.
5Rewriting the relation between Peasant’s and Rebel’s peaceful incomes yields the con-
dition that Peasant will stay at his ﬁelds as long as τ < 1 −
ηl
αyt.
6Ndikumana and Boyce (1998) describe how the enrichment strategies of Zaire’s dictator
Mobutu (who probably had a γ(Z) close to 0) included direct transfer of enormous pro-
ceeds from natural resource exports to presidential accounts. See also Bigsten and Moene
(1996) for an analysis of various forms of rent diversion in Kenya and Congdon Fors and
Olsson (2004) for a model where institutions constraining expropriation are endogenously
determined.
7We could have included tax revenue as a component of the budget constraint below,
but that would have made the model more complicated without adding anything to the key
line of argument that natural resource rents potentially increase the stock of public goods.
83.2 Equilibrium
Let us assume that after a peaceful ﬁrst period, Ruler and Rebel allocate their
second period resources in a two-stage, sequential game. Ruler, who might
be regarded as a Stackelberg leader, moves ﬁrst and decides on how much of
Citizen’s labor he needs in order defend his natural resources (b2), taking into
account the likely response from Rebel in terms of levels of predation (a2).8
In the second stage, the predatory Rebel makes his actual move and takes
R u l e r ’ sc h o i c ea sg i v e n .
In order to ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use backward induc-
tion and start our analysis in the second stage when Rebel chooses the levels
of a2 and q2 that maximize his utility function. By inserting (2) into (1), we





+ η(l − a2) (5)



















The upper case describes a scenario where no interior local maximum
exists. This implies that the opportunity cost of predation is too high and
that Rebel optimally chooses to allocate all eﬀort to production (q2 = l).
The lower row in (6) deﬁnes an interior solution where the optimal a∗
is a quadratic function that turns out to have two roots; one positive and
one negative. Disregarding the negative one, we can establish the reaction







(7) deﬁn e sa l lr e s p o n s e st h a tR e b e lm a k e st oag i v e nl e v e lo fR u l e r ’ sc h o s e n
defense level b2.9 Simple calculus shows that a∗
2 is a positive or negative,
concave function of b2,a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 .A tl o wl e v e l so fb2, an increase in
Ruler’s strength increases Rebel’s predatory eﬀorts whereas beyond a certain
level, Rebel’s predatory eﬀort decreases with b2. No predatory activity at all
will take place (a∗





Analogously, Rebel will only initiate a conﬂict (a∗






will use this result below.
8Models of appropriative conﬂict often take the form of a Cournot game (Hirshleifer,
1991, 1995). However, in the type of predator-prey model described here, it seems more
appropriate to to think of the situation as a two-stage game where the prey moves ﬁrst.
9We assume that we can rule out the existence of upper boundary solutions where a
∗
2 = l.
9When we have thus derived Rebel’s reaction function, we can go back to
the ﬁrst stage and insert this expression into Ruler’s utility function. Ruler’s





b2δηD + τA(n − b2)
α k1−α
2 . (9)
where c = D+ταy1 is independent of b2.T a k i n gt h eﬁrst-order condition for














This expression does not allow for an explicit solution for b∗
2. However, it
is still useful for deriving comparative statics results.
3.3 Comparative Statics
Straightforward implicit diﬀerentiation on (10) shows for instance that b∗
2
increases with appropriable natural resource rents δD a n dw i t ht h et o t a ls i z e
of formal sector labor n, and decreases with formal sector productivity A
for all α ∈ (0,1). Without loss of generality, we might therefore make the
assumption that α =1 /2, which allows us to deﬁne an explicit solution to b∗
2:









This level constitutes a conﬂict equilibrium where a∗
2 > 0 if and only if δD +
(τA)2(k1+γ(Z)D)
4η − nη > 0.
Proof. The expression in (11) is easily obtained from the ﬁrst-order
condition in (10), given that α =1 /2. We further insert k2 = k1 +γ (Z) from
the budget constraint in (4). As was stated in (8), we will have a conﬂict
equilibrium with a∗
2 > 0 if b∗
2 < δD
η . By manipulating this inequality, we get
the result that δD +
(τA)2(k1+γ(Z)D)
4η − nη > 0
As in the general case, the Lemma shows that b∗
2 increases with appropri-
able natural resource rents D and with the size of formal sector labor n,a n d
decreases with formal sector productivity A a n dw i t ht h eq u a l i t yo fp r o p e r t y
rights institutions Z. The second result in Lemma 1 might be summarized
by saying that a conﬂict equilibrium where both Rebel and Ruler allocate
resources to an appropriative struggle is more likely the greater is D, A and
Z, and the smaller is n.10 For the sake of concreteness, we will assume that
Lemma 1 applies in the derivations below.
10See Olsson and Congdon Fors (2004) for a more detailed analysis of the ’trigger factors’
that need to be in place for a conﬂict equilibrium to occur.
10The equilibrium share of appropriable natural resources that Rebel man-
















Rebel’s success (and Ruler’s corresponding level of failure) is thus mainly a
function of natural resource abundance, productivity, institutions, and the
absolute size of the formal sector:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium share of appropriable resources that Rebel
conquers increases with δ,D ,A ,a n dZ and decreases with n and η.
Proof. The results follow from straightforward diﬀerentiation.
The expression in (12) describes the realized success of a predatory rebel
group.11 Rebel’s success is positively related to the productivity in the formal
sector A, with institutions against corruption Z a n dw i t ht h et a xr a t eτ.H i g h
levels of A, Z,a n dτ mean that Ruler’s marginal utility of having Citizen
work in the formal sector is high which makes b∗
2 relatively low and thus p∗
2
high. A high productivity in Rebel’s subsistence production η implies that
his opportunity cost of predation is high, which lowers the equilibrium share
of conquered resources.





2 · k2 = A
v u u t





This result might be summarized in a Proposition:
Proposition 3 The production shortfall in the formal sector due to the ap-
propriative conﬂict increases with δ, D, and η, n and A..
Proof. The results follow from straightforward diﬀerentiation.
Lastly, and most importantly, we will make some comparative statics on
the growth of formal output. From (3), we know Citizen’s formal sector
output, which is identical to total aggregate output in the economy. The
growth rate over the two relevant periods is approximately equal to


































11For instance, it might be thought of as explaining the share of total natural resources
that rebel groups like the RUF in Sierra Leone had managed to lay their hands on after
years of conﬂict.
11This reduced-form expression shows one of the basic intuitions behind the
model; whereas natural resource abundance crowds out labor from the formal
sector through its positive impact on b∗
2 (which is bad for growth), it will also
induce greater investments in public utilities (which is beneﬁcial for growth).
Whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing will depend on the relative
strength of the two eﬀects. On an elementary level, it is clear that if there
are no potential rebels so that a∗
2 and b∗
2 are zero, natural resources will be
positive for growth. On the other hand, if Ruler must allocate a substantial
force to defend his rents and if institutions are so poor that γ (Z) is close to
zero so that almost all proceeds vanish in various forms of corruption, then
an abundance of natural resources will be detrimental to growth.
More formally, we can derive :
Proposition 4 (i) The equilibrium growth rate of aggregate output increases













. (ii) The marginal eﬀect of D on the growth rate
increases with the quality of institutions Z.
Proof. (i) The results regarding A, Z, η,a n dδ are straightforward. The
ﬁrst derivative of the growth rate with respect to natural resource abundance
yields:
∂g






2(k1+γ(Z)). Recalling that n − b∗
2 = h2 and that
k2 =( k1 + γ (Z)), we can easily rearrange and get the result.



























γ(Z)2. The last term is clearly positive. We further
know from Lemma 1 that
∂b∗
2
∂Z < 0. The derivative of b∗
2 with respect to
D is (b∗
2)












∂Z < 0. Hence, it must be the case that
∂2g
∂D∂Z > 0.
A high formal sector productivity A decreases b∗
2 and thus increases the
growth rate. In a similar manner, a high quality of property rights institu-
tions Z decreases b∗
2 and increases k2. Rebel’s subsistence productivity η is
negatively related to predatory activity a2 which means that if η is large so
that a2 is small, the marginal utility of allocating labor to defense is great,
implying a high b∗
2 and a low growth rate. The logic for δ is simply that if
the price fall in the second period is substantial so that δ is small, there will
be small rents to ﬁght for, which will mean a low b∗
2 a n dh i g hg r o w t h .
The central result of the proposition concerns D. The condition that
growth will decline with D if (b∗
2)
0 /γ (Z) >h 2/k2 means that there will be
a curse of natural resources if the relative marginal eﬀect of D on defense
forces (on the left-hand side) is larger than the inverted capital/labor ratio
in the formal sector (on the right-hand side). What this means is that if the
12formal sector at the time of the struggle is relatively labor intensive - perhaps
because it is dominated by modern agriculture - then the marginal product
of labor will be relatively small. A loss of labor to the appropriative struggle
is therefore less harmful to growth than in the case of a capital intensive
manufacturing sector where the marginal product of labor is high.
The expression also makes clear the crucial role of the “corruption func-
tion” γ(Z). As stated in (ii) in the Proposition above, the eﬀect of natural
resource abundance on growth will depend on the institutions constraining
government expropriation and corruption. Should γ (Z) approach zero, then
∂g
∂D < 0, whereas it is quite possible that
∂g
∂D > 0 if γ (Z) approaches unity.
This conﬁrms the basic conclusion in some recent empirical articles that the
presence of a curse of natural resources will depend to a great extent on the
quality of institutions (Boschini et al, 2003; Mehlum et al, 2002).
4 Diamonds Are A Rebel’s Best Friend
Several diﬀerent kinds of natural resources have served as rewards for rebel-
lions and as sources of revenue to dictators (see for instance Collier, 2000b or
Olsson and Congdon Fors, 2004). The argument made in this section is that
among all natural resources, diamonds are the ideal reward for a predatory
rebel, in other words one that ensures exceptionally high levels of D, γ, and
δ. The reason why this is the case can be summarized by two terms; appro-
priability and tradability. Starting with appropriability, this term reﬂects the
characteristic that it is actually possible to gain physical control and make
economic use of whatever D represents. ’Point resources’ such as mineral de-
posits are readily appropriable since they are immobile while it is much more
complicated to gain control of, for instance, a herd of elephants. Plantations
and ﬁelds of corn are also immobile, but when an enemy approaches, it is easy
for a retreating army to burn ﬁelds or destroy harvested crops. Even oil ﬁelds
can be destroyed by a retreating army, as the Iraqis showed in the Gulf War.
In the terminology of our model, these resources therefore have a relatively
low appropriability. A mine with ore imbedded in rock, on the other hand, is
not easily destroyed. Furthermore, once diamonds have been extracted, they
are a reliable long-term store of value, unlike timber or crops.
Apart from being readily appropriable, diamonds are also highly tradable.
This term encompasses several characteristics. To begin with, diamonds’ most
obvious advantage is their high average price per carat. Diamond prices vary
signiﬁcantly depending on clarity and color and whether they are sold as
gemstones or as industrial diamonds. Rough diamonds are therefore far from
a homogeneous good. In the year 2000, the average world market price per
carat was 71$ (Rombouts, 2001), which is roughly equivalent to 355,000$ per
kg. To make a comparison, the price for gold in 2000 was roughly 9,000$ per
kg (or 280$ per troy ounce (US Geological Survey, 2001, Gold, Table 1)), i.e.
the price of diamonds was on average about 40 times higher than that of gold.
Needless to say, prices of metals like silver, copper, or iron are even lower. But
not only is the price of diamonds very high, it has also been kept relatively
13stable over time due to the market power enjoyed by the dominating company
DeBeers.
Tradability is also intended to reﬂect the transaction costs involved in the
exchange of a commodity for money or for other goods. In comparison to for
instance oil and timber, the transportation of diamonds is easy and cheap.
Traders can carry anything from a single stone to a whole wagonload. Even
for being a gemstone, this ﬂexible practical size is unusual (US Geological
Survey, 2001, Gemstones, Table 1). Unlike drugs like cocaine, which might
also be illegally carried in very small amounts, dogs in a customs oﬃce can
not sniﬀ diamonds, nor will the stones be disclosed by metal detectors.
Once polished, it is almost impossible to determine a diamond’s place of
origin. This circumstance makes the imposition of sanctions (in other words,
lowering δ) a complicated issue. In order to make the UN sanctions against
the exportation of conﬂict diamonds more eﬃcient, some thirty governments
involved in the so called ’Kimberley Process’ agreed in late 2001 to introduce
and honour a certiﬁcate of origin scheme (Diamond High Council, 2001). How-
ever, so far, the mainly artisanal, small-scale production in Central Africa, in
combination with porous country borders, mean that conﬂict diamonds from
Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia and Congo-Kinshasa easily slip into neighboring
countries that are not under sanctions like Uganda, Central African Republic
and Congo-Brazzaville, whereupon they are re-exported to the major trading
centers in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Israel (Panel of Experts, 2001b).
According to some sources, the smuggling is often carried out by foreign-




T h em o d e la b o v ep r e d i c t st h a tt h eg r o w th rate of output per capita will be a
negative function of natural resource rents D in countries where institutions
are weak. The chain of causality runs from resource incomes D to Ruler’s
optimal level of defense forces b∗
2 that crowd out labor from the formal sec-
tor and reduce growth. Unlike in Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2001), the key
dependent variable in our setup is not social conﬂict but economic growth,
although Table 1 clearly suggests a strong empirical relationship between di-
amond abundance and social conﬂict. We will thus follow the reduced form
equilibrium growth expression in (13) and regress growth directly on D. The
latter variable will henceforth be a measure of rents from diamond extraction.
Table 1 also indicates that almost all diamond producing countries (the ex-
ceptions being Canada and Australia) are developing countries with relatively
weak institutions. We therefore expect a basic negative relationship between
diamond abundance and growth. We will also use a measure of institutional
q u a l i t ya sap r o x yf o rZ. The other possible sources of inﬂuence, like A, δ,
and τ will be regarded as structural parameters which are not quantitatively
14assessed in this section.
More speciﬁcally, the cross-country growth regression that is tested below
is of the typical ’Barro-style’:
g = α + βX + φK + ε (14)
In this set-up, g is a N × 1 vector of economic growth rates, α is a constant,
X is a N × c matrix of control variables with a vector of estimates β, K is
a N × d matrix of variables derived from the theoretical section above, φ is
its vector of estimates and ε ∼ N
¡
0,υ2¢
contains the normally distributed
error terms. The key variables for this article are of course those included in
K, that is primarily diamond rents but also institutional quality. Diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of K will be used depending on what the regression is intended
to test. The basic hypothesis is that there should be a negative relationship
between growth and diamond rents D in the sample at hand. X is a set of
control variables that follow from standard growth accounting (see for instance
Sala-i-Martin, 1997).12
5.2 Data
The empirical section presents a cross-country regression analysis using a sam-
ple of 131 countries that in 1999 had a population of more than 1 million and
for which there was available data on growth rates. The period analyzed is
1990-99, i.e. the Post-Cold War era. There are two reasons for this choice
of time period: First, the arrival of the Post-Cold War era brought a new
economic regime to the world that was in many ways structurally diﬀerent
from the previous one. Studying growth patterns during this period is in-
teresting in itself. Second, it is frequently claimed in the literature that the
post-Cold War era initiated a greater strategic interest in natural resources.
With the end of ﬁnancing from the US and the Soviet bloc, rebel and terrorist
movements around the world often had to reorganize their ﬁnancing activities
towards natural resource exploitation (Klare, 2001).
The eﬀect of diamond abundance on growth is the central issue in the
empirical section. In their important empirical studies on natural resources
and growth, Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001) use the ratio of primary product
exports to GDP as the explanatory variable and refer to it as a measure
of natural resource abundance. In a similar fashion, we have constructed a
variable DiaGDP that estimates the value of diamond production in each
country as a share of GDP. Unfortunately, it was not possible to estimate the
value of production in the starting year, 1990. Instead, the average price of
diamonds in each country in the year 2000 was used (Rombouts, 2001) and
was multiplied by production quantity for 1999 (US Geological Survey, 2001).
This estimated value of diamond production was then divided by total real
12As discussed by Temple (1999), there are a number of potential problems with this
simple approach such as multicollinearity, parameter heterogeneity, and the impact of out-
liers. These problems will be addressed below. We chose nevertheless to use this type of
framework in order to make our results comparable to previous studies in this tradition.
15GDP in 1999 (latest available year). The resulting variable DiaGDP serves
as a proxy for the intensity of diamond production in a country. Due to
relatively stable prices and production, this level is not likely to have changed
much during the 1990s. Only 18 countries produce any diamond and all
remaining countries therefore score zero.
However, the value of diamond production as a share of GDP for a single
year is not really a proper measure of diamond abundance. Given two coun-
tries with identical levels of diamond extraction, the country which has the
somewhat higher GDP is automatically also less diamond abundant according
to this measure. Hence, DiaGDP is partly an endogenous variable that might
also be correlated with the control variables in X, a problem which is not
adequately discussed in Sachs and Warner (1997) who uses a similar measure.
In order to ﬁnd a more accurate measure of abundance, we calculated the
average annual production during 1990-99 in the 18 countries that produced
diamonds in 1999 (US Geological Survey, various issues). Taking the mean
removes possible cyclical aspects of production. In order to compare mean-
ingfully diamond abundance in vast countries like Russia with that in small
ones like Sierra Leone, we divided total production by land area to create the
variable DiaArea. The (extreme) outlier is Botswana with roughly 31 carats
per sq km with Congo-Kinshasa second at 8.41 carats.
As a third indicator of diamond rents, we assessed the value of total pro-
duction in the year 2000 and divided this ﬁgure with land area to get pro-
duction value in hundreds of US dollars per sq km. The resulting variable is
referred to as DiVaAr. Unlike DiaGDP, and many other indicators of natural
resource rents or abundance used in the empirical literature, DiaArea and
DiVaAr have the advantage of being truly exogenous.
The other key determinant of appropriative conﬂict and growth is pro-
ductivity in the formal sector. Productivity depends to a great extent on the
quality of social institutions, as shown empirically by Hall and Jones (1999).
As a proxy for formal sector productivity, we employ an often used variable
(in this article, referred to as InstEnv) that measures the quality of the in-
stitutional environment in a country. Originally constructed by Knack and
Keefer (1995), it has been used by for instance Hall and Jones (1999) and
Olsson and Hibbs (2003). The variable exhibits the average coding over 1986-
95 of ﬁve broad political-institutional characteristics, normalized to a 0 to 1
scale where the country with the best institutions score 1.
Data on levels and growth rates of GDP, investment ratios, life expectancy,
and land area were collected from World Bank (2001). Average growth rates
are calculated as (log GDP per capita 1999 - log GDP per capita 1990)/9.
Growth rates range between 8.8% (China) to -11.7% (Moldova) with a mean at
0.3%. Transition countries from the former Soviet Union are overrepresented
among the countries with the lowest growth.
165.3 Results
The simple relationship between economic growth and diamond abundance for
16 diamond producing countries where data was available, is shown in Figure
1. The variable used as a proxy for diamond abundance is DiaGDP. Figure
1 displays some evidence of a negative (but not signiﬁcant) relationship be-
tween growth and diamond abundance. The extreme observation to the right
is Botswana, which has a relatively high growth rate. When Botswana is in-
cluded, a non-linear convex relationship ﬁts the data points best. If Botswana
is dropped, however, a linear negative coeﬃcient becomes signiﬁcant and R2
rises from 0.12 to 0.40. A similar pattern arises also when the other indicators
of diamond abundance are used.13
Does this relationship survive when we control for other variables? The
ﬁrst set of formal regression results is displayed in Table 2. The three indepen-
dent variables at the top are control variables widely used in growth regres-
sions (LGDP1990 - Log GDP per capita in initial year 1990, InvRat - Gross
capital formation as a share of GDP in 1990, and LifExp - Life expectancy at
birth in 1990). Using initial levels arguably neutralizes any concerns of joint
endogeneity between InvRat and the dependent variable. Might our measures
of diamond abundance be positively correlated with LGDP1990? A simple
Pearson correlation coeﬃcient shows that the correlation is never higher than
10% and that the sign is actually negative.
As expected, LifExp has a positive and highly signiﬁcant sign in all spec-
iﬁcations. LifExp is usually interpreted as an indicator of the general quality
of human capital. There is also evidence of conditional convergence in the
Post-Cold War era; LGDP1990 is always negative and signiﬁcant at the 10%
level, implying that poorer countries, all else equal, tend to grow faster than
richer ones. In line with what one would predict, the estimate of InvRat is
positive, although never signiﬁcantly so. The reason for this is that many
transition countries like Russia had very high investment rates in 1990 and
then experienced something of a growth collapse in the early 1990s.14
A dummy for the 27 former communist countries or Soviet republics in
the sample (Transit) is always strongly negative and signiﬁcant. Unlike many
previous studies (for instance Sala-i-Martin, 1997), a dummy for Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) is not at all signiﬁcant and even shifts signs. This result does not
change when a measure of diamond abundance is included. We have therefore
dropped SSA in speciﬁcations (3)-(5).
The key results from Table 2 are those that are received by including
our proxies for diamond abundance, DiaGDP, DiaArea, and DiVaAr. When
Botswana is included, there is a convex relationship between growth and
diamonds, even after controlling for other inﬂuences. The estimates for Di-
aGDP in (2) and (3) are negative and highly signiﬁcant whereas the square
13Due to its outlier status in all regressions on growth and natural resources, Botswana
has been a frequently analyzed example in the development literature (Acemoglu et el, 2001;
Auty, 2001). The country will therefore not be extensively discussed in this article.
14Excluding transition countries from the sample makes InvRat positive and signiﬁcant.
17(DiaGDP)2 is positive and signiﬁcant. The same holds for our other proxy,
DiaArea, in (4). In this speciﬁcation, p-values for DiaArea are very low, all
control variables are highly signiﬁcant except InvRat, and the adjusted R2 is
0.43. The same basic pattern emerges when we regress our third indicator of
diamond rents, DiViAr, on growth in (5).
Six more tests are carried out in Table 3. All speciﬁcations in Table 3
except (2) and (5) have used the four control variables in Table 2 as regressors,
but they are not essential to this story, their estimates have been omitted. In
speciﬁcation (1), we have included the second variable in K; the institutions-
variable InstEnv. In (1), the new regressor (DiaGDP/InstEnv) has been
created by simply dividing DiaGDP by InstEnv. The prediction from Eq.
(??) in the theoretical section is that this variable should be negatively related
to growth. The variable provides an indicator of the strength of incentives for
predation; a great diamond abundance coupled with weak social institutions
should make predation more likely. Interestingly, it turns out that Congo-
Kinshasa now gets the highest score (57.6) with Sierra Leone second (55.2).
As hypothesized, (DiaArea/InstEnv) is negative and strongly signiﬁcant in
the growth regression.
One possible concern with our set-up so far is that diamond rents are
correlated with institutional quality, which usually has a positive impact on
growth. In (2), we therefore include DiaGDP and its squared value along-
side InstEnv to see if the eﬀect disappears. Due to the well-known strong
correlation between InstEnv and some of our previous control variables (in
particular initial income levels), the latter have been dropped in this speciﬁ-
cation. The result is that DiaGDP retains its strong convex relationship with
growth while InstEnv is positive and signiﬁcant. Going back to Figure 2, we
can infer that diﬀerences in institutional quality account for at least some of
the diﬀerences in growth between similarly diamond abundant countries such
as Congo-Kinshasa and Namibia.
In the ﬁnal four tests, we have varied our sample. In (3) and (4), the
extreme observation Botswana has been excluded. The inﬂuence of this one
observation is illustrated by comparing (1) with (3); the estimate for (Di-
aGDP/InstEnv) increases from -0.08 to -0.10 and R2 rises from 0.40 to 0.44.
It further turns out that the convexity results for DiaGDP no longer holds. A
linear speciﬁcation as used in (4) now ﬁts the data best. As mentioned above,
this seems to suggest that Botswana drives the convexity result. Without
Botswana, the pure hypothesis in Proposition 4 of a negative relationship
receives strong support.
Lastly, in (5) and (6), we have split our sample into Sub-Saharan Africa
(including Botswana) and the rest of the world. As expected, our hypoth-
esis works well for the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. As is well known,
institutional quality is very low in this region, implying that the payoﬀsf r o m
predation are relatively large, which in turn implies a negative relationship.
The relationship is negative also for the rest of the world but not signiﬁcant.
In this sample of 86 countries, only 6 are diamond producers, which makes it
18diﬃcult to draw any clear conclusions.
In summary, the regressions presented in this section display some support
for the hypothesis of a negative relationship between diamond abundance and
growth, in particular when extreme outlier Botswana is excluded. The pattern
persists even after controlling for institutional environment and variables often
used in growth accounting.
6 Conclusions
The curse of natural resources has been conﬁrmed empirically by several stud-
ies. Much less progress has been made in understanding the source of the
curse. This article focuses on the relationship between diamond abundance,
appropriative conﬂict, and economic growth. By extending the conﬂict-theoretical
framework created by Grossman (1991) and Hirshleifer (1991), we outline a
model of a Stackelberg game between a ruler, in control of a ﬂow of nat-
ural resource proceeds, and a potential predator. The link to output growth
runs via a third agent; an ordinary, peaceful citizen who produces all oﬃ-
cial output and whose production is hurt by the appropriative struggle. In
equilibrium, the model predicts that growth has a negative relationship with
natural resource abundance if the country has weak institutions.
Out of all natural resources, diamonds are arguably the ideal reward for a
potential predator due to their extremely high value per carat, their ﬂexible
practical size and scale of extraction, their indestructibility, their tradability
all over the world, and the diﬃculty with which their place of origin can be
established. Using data on growth, income per capita, and other variables
for a large sample of countries, it is shown that three proxies for diamond
abundance display a signiﬁcant negative and convex relationship that becomes
strictly negative when extremely diamond-abundant Botswana is excluded.
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Civil War  
1990-99
4 
Angola   1,732  90.24  1.39  -3.14  Yes 
Australia 39,008  45.00  5.08  2.60  No 
Botswana 17,563  74.94  30.98  1.91  No 
Brazil 1,162  33.33  0.14  1.04  No 
Canada 230  100.00  0.02  1.43  No 
CAF 478  72.73  0.77  -0.50  No 
China 1,083  20.00  0.12  8.78  No 
Congo-Kinshasa 19,074  20.48 8.41 -8.33 Yes 
Cote d'Ivoire  123  67.74  0.39  0.11  No 
Ghana 686  80.19  3.02  1.69  No 
Guinea 136  74.55  0.56  1.35  No 
Liberia 85  60.00  0.89  n.a.  Yes 
Namibia 1,326  94.57  1.61  1.09  No 
Russia 20,250  50.00  1.20  -5.62  Yes 
Sierra Leone  276  75.00  3.84  -7.86  Yes 
South Africa  10,017  39.92  8.20  -0.58  No 
Venezuela 265  62.11  0.30  -0.46  No 
Zimbabwe 93  33.33  0.24  0.27  No 
All  114,586 50.04 3.73  -0.37  - 
 
1 In thousands carats. 
2 Gemstone percentage of total production in 1999. 
3 In real GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$). Growth rate for Congo calculated between 1990-98. 
4 Refers to civil wars incurring more than 1,000 deaths.  





























Figure 1: Relationship between diamond production as share of GDP in 1999 and average GDP per capita 
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Table 2: Regressions on average growth rate of GDP per capita, 1990-1999. 
 
  Growth rate of GDP per capita 
 












































































   


































2   
 
    0.01 
(.00) 
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2  0.39 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 
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Table 3: Robustness tests. 
 
  Growth rate of GDP per capita 
 
Independent variable  (1)
a   (2)
a  (3)












































        
Adj. R
2  0.40 0.26 
 
0.44 0.46 0.26 0.45 
N  108 108 107 122  36  86 
  
Notes: In parenthesis are p-values. In addition to the variables in the table, all specifications except (2) and (5) 
regress growth on four control variables (X={LGDP1990, InvRat1990, LifExp, Transit}) with unreported 
estimates. Specification (5) controls for all variables in X except Transit.  
a Full sample. 
b Full sample excluding Botswana.  
c Only Sub-Saharan Africa. 
d Full sample excluding Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
  
 